Last December I wrote an article for a disreputable Cardinals website that shall not be linked here. The article was an attempt to evaluate what we can statistically expect out of Albert Pujols over the course of a ten year contract (which was what was being discussed at the time).

In order to do this, I took the WAR values and home run totals of players similar to Pujols – Willie Mays, Hank Aaron, Babe Ruth, etc. – and created a chart that measures the percentage of increase/decrease in the performance of these players as they moved through their thirties. The chart looked something like this:

WAR STATISTICS

	27-30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
Mays	9.3	114%	113	113	118	93	46	70	37	53	70
Aaron	8.8	80%	80	93	65	94	56	75	40	55	22
Ruth	8.9	135%	144	124	92	120	128	101	78	56	-
R. Jackson	6.6	61%	56	59	73	8	44	0	0	20	20
C. Ripken	7.2	40%	47	56	57	47	21	22	33	25	0
Henderson	6.4	156%	78	89	39	55	48	33	30	0	39
Tot Avg. % change		74%	86	89	74	69	57	37	35	35	25

HOME RUN STATISTICS

	27-30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
Mays	33	148%	115	142	157	112	66	69	39	85	55
Aaron	37	86%	119	105	78	119	103	127	92	108	54
Ruth	37	127%	162	146	124	132	124	111	92	59	-
R. Jackson	31	103%	87	94	132	48	125	45	81	87	58
C. Ripken	25	56%	96	224	68	104	68	56	72	60	56
Henderson	19	147%	95	79	216	32	47	47	84	74	63
Tot Avg. % change		111%	112	132	129	91	81	76	77	79	48

I applied these percentages to Pujols’ numbers from the previous three years, and I came up with the following numbers:

WAR PROJECTIONS – PUJOLS

	27-30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
Pujols	8.6	6.4	7.4	7.9	6.4	5.9	4.9	3.2	3	3	2.2

HOME RUN PROJECTION – PUJOLS

	27-30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
Pujols	40	44	45	53	52	36	32	30	30	32	19

As you can see, my projections based on these measurements did not accurately predict the year Pujols would have in 2011 (year 31 on the chart). Pujols ended up with a 5.4 WAR and 37 home runs on the year.

As you can see, percentages show that there is a measurable uptick in production in the early thirties of elite ballplayers, followed by a steady and inevitable decline from 35-onward. However, the year Pujols had in 2011, when compared to his previous two years, shows a player entering an early decline phase. Over the last three years, Pujols has declined 11% per year in home runs, and about 22% per year in WAR value.

So, if we apply these declining rates to a nine year contract, we see the following values over the length of such a contract:

WAR PROJECTIONS – PUJOLS (projected by current decline rate)

	27-30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
Pujols	8.6	5.4	4.2	3.3	2.6	1.7	1.3	1.0	0.7	0.6	0.5

HOME RUN PROJECTION – PUJOLS (projected by current decline rate)

	27-30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40
Pujols	40	37	33	29	26	23	21	19	17	15	13

So the Cardinals (or any other team) is looking at potentially paying a 40 year-old Pujols somewhere around $25 million a year in 2020 for 13 home runs and WAR value near zero.

Even more alarming, the Cardinals would be paying Pujols that money for declining production while simultaneously handicapping their ability to exploit his presence. Not only would the team be less competitive with the additional drain on resources (unless the farm system prospects all really come through for once), but the team will also not see any of the milestones that would make the contract more profitable for them. At that decreasing rate of home run production, Pujols will hit 641 home runs in his career. That’s a bunch, for sure, but still only placing him fifth on the all-time list. The profitability of such a contract then decreases substantially.

Factored into these numbers is Pujols’ physical condition. He’s noticeably heavier than he was two or three years ago. He doesn’t run nearly as well. He has a variety of aches and pains that have dogged him in recent years. Pujols is a competitor, but how much is his body going to cooperate over the length of such a contract?

My gut tells me that the numbers for keeping Pujols - in annual average value (AAV) or in years – just don’t add up to the amount of production he’s on pace to generate. If the Cardinals and Pujols are serious about crafting a contract that works for both sides, then this contract needs to be seriously front-loaded (meaning a large chunk of the money is paid in the next three years) or shortened to a four or five year deal with club options. The risks, based on the declining scale established by Pujols himself, are just too great for a franchise that expects to be competitive in the long run.